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Historically, judges have had wide discretion in sentencing
convicted criminals.1 These practices naturally resulted in sub-
stantial disparity among federal courts with regard to sentences
given to similarly situated offenders.2 In response to this prob-
lem, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,1 which
created the United States Sentencing Commission.4 The Act au-
1 See Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions, in THE SEN-
TENCING CoimussIoN AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987).
"Typically, American statutes set only the maximum penalties for different crimes,
and the judge had the choice of any sentence within that limit: a fine, probation, a jail
sentence, or a shorter or longer term in state prison." Id. (emphasis in original); see
also Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) ("It is now well established
that a judge... is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate
sentence."); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949) (observing that trial
judge had discretion to change defendant's sentence from life imprisonment to death);
ARTmUR W. CAmPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 1.3 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing indetermi-
nate sentencing); PIERCE O'DoNNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENC-
ING SYSTEM 1-15 (1977) (describing "national scandal" created by standardless sen-
tencing system); Julia L. Black, Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Sentences
Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States, 75
IOWA L. REV. 767, 769 (1990) (noting "judges' vast power in sentencing" and resulting
disparities existing under prior sentencing system).
2 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COADiESSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL 2 (1992) [hereinafter SENTENCING MANUAL] (disparate sentences were pri-
mary reason behind formation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1989). The Mistretta Court noted that prior to the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines "serious disparities" were common in criminal sentences.
Id.
3 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1988 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1988)).
4 Id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98); see also SENTENCING MANUAL, supra note 2,
at 1. The Commission "is an independent agency in the judicial branch .... Its
principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies.., that Will assure the ends of
justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for
offenders convicted of federal crimes." Id.; see also Mary Buffington, Comment, Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United
States, 50 LA. L. REV. 117, 132 (1989). The composition of the Commission is re-
stricted by the Sentencing Reform Act. Id. The Commission has seven voting mem-
bers and one nonvoting member who are appointed by the President and must be
confirmed by the Senate. Id. These members are charged with promulgating and
overseeing the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Three of the voting mem-
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thorized the Commission to promulgate mandatory sentencing
guidelines.5 On November 1, 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines (the "Guidelines") became effective.6 Almost immediately,
the Guidelines were challenged as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to the judicial branch of government, with
many lower courts holding that the Guidelines were unconstitu-
tional.7 In 1989 the Supreme Court put an end to this debate by
upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v.
United States.8
Nevertheless, one provision of the Guidelines that continues
to be controversial is section 1B1.3, the "Relevant Conduct Provi-
sion."9 This provision allows the government, at a presentencing
bers must be federal judges, and the attorney general or his designate serves as the
nonvoting member. Id.
5 SENTENCING MANUAL, supra note 2, at 1. See generally Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
HoFsTRA L. REv. 1 (1988) (discussing debates that occurred before enactment of
Guidelines).
6 SENTENCING MANUAL, supra note 2, at 1.
7 See Black, supra note 1, at 768. Within one year, 157 federal judges held that
the Guidelines were unconstitutional. Id.
8 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). The Court stated:
We conclude that in creating the Sentencing Commission-an unusual hy-
brid in structure and authority-Congress neither delegated excessive legis-
lative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers
among the coordinate Branches. The Constitution's structural protections
do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert body located within
the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines
consistent with such significant statutory direction as is present here. Nor
does our system of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from
calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch
in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the Act is constitutional.
Id.
9 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). Section 1B1.3(a) provides that relevant conduct shall be
determined on the basis of the following:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in
the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme,
endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activ-
ity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in prep-
aration for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would
require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in sub-
divisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
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hearing,10 to present evidence of the convicted defendant's prior
criminal activity, including uncharged criminal activity that re-
lates to the offense of conviction.'1 When considered by the judge
during sentencing, relevant conduct can have a serious impact on
the offender's actual sentence, and has thus justifiably been called
the "Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." 12 Unfor-
tunately, the Guidelines do not specify the standard of proof to be
applied at the presentencing hearing,"3 and the Supreme Court
has only indirectly addressed this issue by upholding an anialo-
gous provison of a state sentencing act in McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania.14 Although most circuit courts have held that a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard should govern,' 5 some conflict
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsec-
tions (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts
and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.
Id.
10 See PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 8[C][3]
(Phylis Skloot Bamberger ed., Supp. 1992) (describing conduct at sentencing hearing).
11 See John R. Steer & William W. Wilkins, Jr., Relevant Conduct: The Corner-
stone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495,497 n.13 (1990). The
"offense of conviction" refers to the specific statute which the defendant has been con-
victed of violating. Id. The "offense of conviction may or may not be the same as the
full scope of actual criminal conduct that accompanied the offense of conviction. Id.
12 See Steer & Wilkins, supra note 11, at 520. The authors state:
The cornerstone of the federal sentencing guidelines, Relevant Conduct, may
be analyzed principally in three dimensions: (1) a temporal dimension, focus-
ing on the totality of a defendant's conduct from the planning stages of the
offense to the post-offense behavior that bears on the possible guideline ad-
justments of obstruction and acceptance of responsibility; (2) an accomplice
attribution dimension, focusing on the conduct of others acting in concert
with the defendant and for which the defendant should be held accountable
at sentencing;, and (3) a third dimension, limited to certain types of offenses
such as drugs or monetary value offenses, that incorporates both of the first
two dimensions and permits the court to look beyond the actual offense of
conviction to the entire range of a defendant's similar offense behavior.
Id. at 520-21.
13 See SENTENCING MANUAL, supra note 2. Nowhere in the Guidelines Manual
does the Commission expressly delineate the standard of proof to be applied. Id. How-
ever, the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines indicates that a preponderance
standard would satisfy due process. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, cmt. ("The Commission believes
that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due pro-
cess requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of
the guidelines to the facts of a case.").
14 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's sentencing act,
which treated visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor rather than an
element of the crime charged. Id. at 91.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1503 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 425 (8th Cir.
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
exists. 16 The Third Circuit has held that, as a matter of due pro-
cess, a clear and convincing standard should apply.' Addition-
ally, some of the circuit courts which have applied a preponder-
ance standard have indicated that this standard would not be
constitutionally permissible in all cases.18 Finally, various dis-
sents in those cases' 9 and other commentators 20 have recently
called for application of a clear and convincing standard.
This Note suggests a resolution to the disagreement regard-
ing the standard of proof to be employed at a presentencing hear-
ing. Part One analyzes the various circuit court opinions dealing
with this issue. Part Two discusses the effect of a reduced liberty
interest on due process considerations. Part Three distinguishes
Supreme Court precedent which stands for the proposition that
due process requires utilization of the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof. Part Four then examines balancing societal inter-
ests against the interests of convicted criminals. Finally, by ana-
lyzing the Supreme Court decision in McMillan, this Note
concludes in Part Five that the preponderance standard is consti-
tutionally sufficient.
I. SURVEY OF CIRCUIT COURTS: No UNIFORu STANDARD
The Third Circuit is the only court to have actually held that
clear and convincing evidence is required to prove relevant con-
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1993); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654,
656-57 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
16 See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (discussing divergent circuit court
opinions).
17 United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1990) ("For the rea-
sons explained above, we hold that in such situations, the fact-finding underlying that
departure must be established at least by clear and convincing evidence.").
18 See, e.g., Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 654. The court indicated, in dicta, that a height-
ened standard of review would be required if the evidence introduced at the sentenc-
ing hearing would have an "extremely disproportionate effect" on the sentence. Id. at
659-60.
19 See Galloway, 976 F.2d at 436 (Bright, J., dissenting) (arguing that preponder-
ance standard violates Constitution); Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 664 (Norris, J., dissenting)
(asserting that clear and convincing standard better serves purposes of Sentencing
Reform Act).
20 See David N. Adair, Jr., House Built on a Weak Foundation-Sentencing
Guidelines And The Preponderance Standard of Proof, 4 FED. SENT. R. 292 (1992)
(advocating clear and convincing standard on grounds that McMillan does not de-
mand preponderance); Judy Clarke, The Need For A Higher Burden of Proof For
Factfinding Under the Guidelines, 4 FED. SENT. R. 300 (1992) (arguing that fairness
requires adoption of clear and convincing standard).
[Vol. 67:639
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duct at the sentencing hearing.21 In United States v. Kikumura,
the Third Circuit found that since the relevant conduct evidence
increased the convict's sentence by a "sufficiently great" magni-
tude, a preponderance standard did not satisfy due process.
22
Other circuits have disagreed, holding that relevant conduct
need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.23 How-
ever, many of these courts have indicated in dicta that clear and
convincing evidence may be required at some point. For example,
the Ninth Circuit has stated that clear and convincing evidence
would be required to prove uncharged or unrelated conduct.24 Ad-
ditionally, the Second and Eighth Circuits have questioned the
propriety of the minimal preponderance standard in situations in
which the offender's sentence may be increased substantially.
25
21 Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101.
22 Id. In Kikumura, the appellant was convicted of passport violations and trans-
portation of explosives. Id. at 1089. The maximum sentence for these crimes was one
hundred years. Id. at 1094 n.9. The original sentence prescribed by the Guidelines for
those offenses was between 27 and 33 months. Id. at 1089. At sentencing, however,
the government introduced evidence that the explosives were made in preparation for
a terrorist bombing. Id. Based on this additional evidence, the prescribed sentence
increased to 30 years. Id. The Third Circuit held that the additional evidence intro-
duced at sentencing had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence and remanded
the matter for resentencing in accordance with this heightened standard. Id.
23 See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing
sentence to be increased from 10 to 30 years based on fact proven by mere preponder-
ance), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2333 (1993); United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d
1520, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding sentence increase from 4 to 29 years based on
quantity of drugs proven at sentencing by preponderance), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2392 (1993); Galloway, 976 F.2d at 425 (requiring that relevant conduct, additional
thefts, be proven by preponderance); United States v. Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 685
(D.C. Cir.) (increasing sentence from one to eight years based on sentencing factors
established by preponderance), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 287 (1992).
24 Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1524. The defendant was convicted of selling 67
grams of cocaine. Id. at 1522. At sentencing, it was established that the defendant
had been involved in a conspiracy whose purpose it was to distribute between 15 and
49.9 kilograms of cocaine. Id. This evidence was used to increase the offender's sen-
tence from four to 29 years. Id. The court upheld the sentence and found that a pre-
ponderance standard was sufficient because the trial judge was only making a quan-
tity determination. Id. at 1523-24. The court indicated that clear and convincing
evidence would have been required if the determination had involved uncharged con-
duct rather than a simple quantity determination. Id.
25 See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 390 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1991). The Townley court, despite re-
versal of the case on other grounds, did not foreclose the possibility of applying a
higher standard in an "exceptional case." Id. at 370. The court based this observation
on the Third Circuit's decision in Kikumura. Id. at 369-70. In Concepcion, the court
held that "disputed facts related solely to sentencing need be proven only by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and that a defendant's right to due process was not violated
by the calculation of his sentence with reference to facts proven only under that stan-
1993]
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These varied approaches indicate that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have failed to accomplish their essential purpose-uni-
formity in the sentencing process.
Irrespective of the concerns addressed by the circuit courts, it
is submitted that a uniform preponderance of evidence standard
should apply at all sentencing hearings held pursuant to section
1B1.3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Once a criminal de-
fendant is convicted, that person can no longer claim constitu-
tional entitlement to the same liberty interest that existed prior to
conviction.26 Furthermore, the interest of society in keeping a
convicted criminal imprisoned outweighs the defendant's limited
liberty interest.2 7 Consequently, due process does not require
clear and convincing proof of relevant conduct at the sentencing
stage.25
II. LESS LIBERTY INTEREST UPON CONVICTION
One of the basic premises behind relaxing the standard of
proof at sentencing, as opposed to the strict "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard applicable at trial, is that a convicted criminal no
longer has a strongly protected liberty interest.29 The defendant
has already been convicted of a crime, with due process being sat-
isfied by requiring the prosecution to prove each and every ele-
ment of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.Y0 Moreover, since
the sentencing range is established by statute, a lesser standard
of proof at sentencing cannot operate to extend the maximum sen-
tence.31 For example, once a defendant is convicted of a crime for
which the maximum sentence is one hundred years, the defend-
dard .... " 983 F.2d at 390. Although the court pointed out that a "high" increase in
the offender's sentence is permissible, id. at 389, it is also noted that an "astronomi-
cal" increase might not be permissible if only supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 389-90. The court gave as an example of an "astronomical" increase, a
change from 12 months to 210 months. Id. at 389.
26 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 n.8 (1989) (holding that once con-
victed, defendant has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in period of poten-
tial incarceration) (citation omitted).
27 See infra notes 29-34, 54-62 and accompanying text (discussing effect of limited
liberty interest on due process concerns).
28 See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (distinguishing sentencing hear-
ing from hearings determined by Supreme Court to require clear and convincing
evidence).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
30 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
31 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) (providing that Guideline sentence may not exceed statuto-
rily authorized sentence); see also United States v. Lawrence, 708 F. Supp. 461, 463
644 [Vol. 67:639
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ant's liberty interest in the one hundred years cannot be said to be
the same as it was prior to the conviction.2 Accordingly, the de-
fendant may be given a sentence within that time period without
the threat of being punished for a more serious crime than the one
committed.33 This is not to say that a convicted criminal has no
liberty interest and is therefore not entitled to due process protec-
tion. Rather, the little constitutional protection retained by the
defendant at the sentencing stage may be sufficiently safeguarded
by requiring that proof of relevant conduct meet a preponderance
standard. 4
III. DuE PROCEss IMPLICATIONS
The constitutionality of a preponderance standard at sentenc-
ing is not inconsistent with the cases in which the Supreme Court
has held that a preponderance standard does not satisfy due pro-
cess.35 The most commonly cited cases in support of adopting a
clear and convincing standard are Addington v. Texas3 6 and
Santosky v. Kramer.37 InAddington, the Supreme Court held that
in attempting to commit an individual to a mental institution, the
state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.3 In
(D.P.R. 1989) (concluding that if sentence determined under Guidelines is greater
than statutory maximum, latter controls).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990). The defend-
ant was convicted of interstate transportation of explosives. Id. at 1093-94. The statu-
tory maximum sentence for the defendants crime was 100 years. Id. at n.9.
33 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 n.8 (1989) (recognizing elimination
upon conviction of defendant's liberty interest in period of time that state was entitled
to confine); Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of Proof And Academic Freedom: Protection
for Institution or Individual?, 82 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 492, 501-03 (1988) (discussing man-
ner in which criminal defendants liberty interest relates to burden of proof at trial).
34 Cf. infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court opin-
ions addressing liberty interests and appropriate standard of proof).
35 See, e.g., Adair, supra note 20, at 292 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974)). Adair points to three situations in which the Supreme Court required
clear and convincing evidence: (1) where moral turpitude was in issue; (2) when the
determination would result in commitment to a mental institution; and (3) in the de-
termination of parental rights in a child custody case. Id. at 293; see also United
States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
("When the stakes are high, as they are when individuals stand to lose their freedom,
we require a high degree of confidence that the disputed issues are determined relia-
bly. ... "), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
36 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
37 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
38 Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33. In Addington, the appellant was indefinitely
committed to a mental institution. Id. at 421. The Texas Supreme Court held that due
1993]
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Santosky, the Court held that in order to remove a child from his
natural parent, clear and convincing evidence was required 9.3  A
closer analysis of these cases demonstrates that these situations
are not analogous to a sentencing hearing, and do not lend support
to applying a clear and convincing standard at sentencing.40
A. No 'Adjudication" at Sentencing
In Santosky, the Court held that in a parental rights termina-
tion hearing the parents' rights must be vigorously protected to
prevent the "erroneous termination of their natural relation-
ship."41 The Court found that in the adjudication between the
state and the parents, the clear and convincing standard fairly al-
locates the risks of erroneous fact-finding.42
Similarly, in Addington, the Supreme Court found that due to
the importance of the adjudication-the determination of mental
competence, a higher standard of proof was needed to insure the
"correctness of factual conclusions."43 It is asserted that there is
process was satisfied as long as the State proved its case by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 422. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that in such a proceeding,
clear and convincing evidence was required as a matter of due process. Id. at 431-33.
39 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. In Santosky, the State of New York initiated a
neglect proceeding against the Santoskys and eventually denied them custody of their
children. Id. at 751. The State was only required to prove its case by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id. The Santoskys challenged this standard on appeal, but the New
York Court of Appeals dismissed the claim. Id. at 752. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and held that in such cases the state must establish its evi-
dence by clear and convincing proof. Id. at 747-48. The Court reasoned that this stan-
dard was required because the state was severing appellants' fundamental liberty
interest in raising their own children. Id. at 758-59. The Court also based its decision
on the fact that until the parents are proven unfit, due process requires that they
receive the benefit of the doubt, and any allocations of the risk of errdr should favor
them. Id. at 760-61.
40 See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. But see Adair, supra note 20, at
293 (comparing sentencing hearing to Supreme Court cases favorably in support of
argument to adopt clear and convincing standard).
41 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760. The Court found that in order to prevent an "errone-
ous termination," the trial court must consider the parents' "vital interest." Id.
42 Id. at 766.
43 Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. The adjudication to which the Court was referring
was the determination of whether an individual should be adjudicated insane and
indefinitely committed to a mental institution. Id. at 425. The Court stated:
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which
might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disor-
der, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally accepta-
ble. Obviously, such behavior is no basis for compelled treatment and surely
none for confinement. However, there is the possible risk that a factfinder
might decide to commit an individual based solely on a few isolated in-
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no equivalent adjudication at sentencing. Rather, the important
adjudication-the guilt of the defendant-is conducted at trial.44
Since the essential adjudication has already been made at trial,
later determinations made during sentencing do not require a
higher "degree of confidence . . . in the correctness of factual
conclusions."45
B. Stigma of a Criminal Conviction Not at Issue
In deciding to apply a clear and convincing standard in Add-
ington, the Supreme Court also took into account the stigma and
inference of moral turpitude which would be placed on the respon-
dent as a result of the adjudication.46  Although an undeniable
stigma attaches to the criminal defendant upon conviction, it is
suggested that the potential for additional stigma at the sentenc-
ing stage is slight, and thus need not be given much weight in
determining the appropriate standard of proof.47 Inasmuch as
stances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the indi-
vidual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyn-
cratic behavior. Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the
factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce
the chances that inappropriate commitments will be ordered.
Id. at 426-27.
44 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) ("The central purpose
of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence ... ." (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)); Robert M.
Grass, Bifucated Jury Deliberations in Criminal Rico Trials, 57 FoRDHAi L. REv. 745,
750 (1989) (using capital punishment cases as examples of how guilt determination
rendered at trial and in sentencing process are two separate proceedings); Sara Sun
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statu-
tory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 1433, 1454
(1984) (describing function of criminal trial as determination of truth or falsity of
charges).
45 Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
46 See id. at 425-26. Central to its decision to apply a clear and convincing stan-
dard was the Court's concern about the adverse social consequences the individual
would suffer by being labelled "insane." Id. The Court stated:
Moreover, it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospi-
tal after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender
adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phe-
nomena "stigma" or choose to call it something else is less important than
that we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant
impact on the individual.
Id.; see also Adair, supra note 20, at 292 (noting that Supreme Court has applied clear
and convincing standard in civil proceedings, such as libel action, where moral turpi-
tude is implied) (citing Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
47 See Julie A. Lumpkin, Note, The Standard of Proof Necessary To Establish
That a Defendant Has Materially Breached a Plea Agreement, 55 FoRDHAm L. REV.
1993]
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sentencing involves neither a significant adjudication nor a sub-
stantial stigmatization of the defendant, it is asserted that the
Supreme Court rulings requiring a clear and convincing standard
are inapplicable.
IV. BALANCING THE RIsKS: CRnINAL V. SocimTY
The propriety of utilizing a standard of proof no greater than
a preponderance at sentencing garners additional support upon
consideration of societal interests. Among society's paramount pe-
nological interests are the punishment and deterrence of unlawful
conduct.4 8 However, these interests must be balanced against the
liberty interest of the criminal defendant, and any risk of impair-
ment to either of the competing interests must be allocated ac-
cordingly.4 9 At the trial stage, the defendant's liberty interest out-
weighs the interests of society.50 As a result, numerous
procedural safeguards exist to protect the defendant;5 for exam-
ple, a criminal defendant is presumed innocent, and due process
requires that such presumption can only be defeated by proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.52 These notions rest on the
sound principle that it is better to set a guilty person free than it
is to send an innocent person to prison; society will bear the risk of
setting a guilty person free.53 Once a criminal defendant is con-
1059, 1080 (1987) (observing that stigma attaches to criminal conviction and is not at
issue during other hearings).
48 See, e.g., M. CImrF BAssIO uN, SuBsTAmrVE CamuNA, LAw 93-96 (1978).
49 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. The Court found that it was necessary to assess
the interest of the individual and the state's interest in order to decide where to place
any risk. Id.
50 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) ("In this context, I view the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a funda-
mental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.").
51 See, e.g., id. (all elements of crime must be proven beyond reasonable doubt);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (involuntary confession may not be used
against criminal defendant); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guarantee-
ing right to counsel to all alleged felony offenders); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in criminal trial); Jane Rutherford, The Myth
of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REv. 1, 93-95 (1992) (discussing various procedural protec-
tions given to defendants in criminal matters).
52 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kathleen H.
Musslewhite, Comment, The Application of Collateral Estoppel In The Tax Fraud
Context: Does It Meet the Requirement of Fairness and Equity?, 33 AM. U. L. Rav. 643,
662 (1984) ("Requiring a prosecutor to demonstrate the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is one of the most important procedural protections in a criminal
trial.").
53 See supra note 50.
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victed, however, these premises evaporate, 54 with the weight of
society's interests increasing and resulting in the criminal defend-
ant's assumption of a greater share of the risks. Since the defend-
ant has already been adequately afforded due process of law and a
compelling reason to give priority to the defendant's interests are
absent, the interests of society should take precedence at the sen-
tencing stage.
The Supreme Court's decision in Santosky lends support to
this theory.55 In Santosky, the Court recognized that there were
two stages to a family court proceeding.56 After a fact-finding
stage, the hearing court must render a determination of parental
fitness.57 It is important to note that the Supreme Court found
that once the fact-finding stage was complete, the balancing of the
parties' interests was drastically changed.5 Once the parent was
determined to be unfit-analogous to a guilty verdict in a criminal
54 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
55 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759-61.
56 Id. at 759-60. The Court found that there was a fact-finding stage followed by a
dispositional stage and distinguished between the two. Id. The Court stated:
The factfinding does not purport-and is not intended-to balance the
child's interest in a normal family home against the parents' interest in rais-
ing the child. Nor does it purport to determine whether the natural parents
or the foster parents would provide the better home. Rather, the factfinding
hearing pits the State directly against the parents. The State alleges that
the natural parents are at fault. Farn. Ct. Act § 614.1.(d). The questions dis-
puted and decided are what the State did---"made diligent efforts,"
§ 614.1.(c)-and what the natural parents did not do---maintain contact
with or plan for the future of the child." § 614.1.(d). The State marshals an
array of public resources to prove its case and disprove the parents' case.
Victory by the State not only makes termination of parental rights possible;
it entails a judicial determination that the parents are unfit to raise their
own children.
At the factfinding, the state cannot presume that a child and his parents
are adversaries. After the state has established parental unfitness at that
initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the
interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge.
Id. (emphasis added).
57 Id. At this stage the court considers such factors as whether the natural par-
ents have "maintain[ed] contact with or plan[ned] for the future of the child." Id. at
760. This phase of the proceeding "entails a judicial determination that the parents
are unfit to raise their own children." Id.
58 See id. at 760-61 ("After the State has established parental unfitness at [the]
initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests
of the child and the natural parents do diverge." (emphasis added)).
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trial-the interests of the child and the foster parents were given
greater weight than the interest of the unfit parent.5"
With respect to societal interests, society is unduly burdened
when a convicted criminal is set free without first having served
an appropriate sentence.60 An appropriate and effective method
of preventing this undesirable circumstance is to lessen the stan-
dard of proof at sentencing to a preponderence, which enhances
society's position compared with that at trial by equally balancing
the interests of each party.61 This theory comports with the prin-
ciple that, once convicted, the criminal is entitled to "less pro-
cess."62 Thus, it is submitted that applying a preponderance stan-
dard when considering "relevant conduct" at sentencing strikes an
appropriate balance between the level of protection due process
requires for the convicted criminal and society's interest in pun-
ishing and deterring criminal conduct.
V. AICMZLL"A'S APPLICABILITY TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
To further support the application of a preponderance stan-
dard, it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court's only decision
which directly addressed this issue. In McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania,63 the Supreme Court approved Pennsylvania's sentenc-
ing statute6 4 which required that sentencing factors be proven by
59 Id. ("[The) judge shall make his order 'solely on the basis of the best interests of
the child,' and thus has no obligation to consider the natural parents' rights in select-
ing dispositional alternatives.").
60 BAssIouNi, supra note 48, at 96-97.
61 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 402-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (discuss-
ing extensively different standards of proof), af/d, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). Judge Weinstein explains that when a preponderance
standard is used, the parties share the risk of error equally. Id. at 402-03.
62 United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 1992). "At the sentencing
stage, however, a convicted criminal is entitled to less process than a presumptively
innocent accused." Id. (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79). The court went on to state
that "'sentencing courts have always operated without constitutionally imposed bur-
dens of proof' when considering the appropriate sentence." Id. (citing McMillan, 477
U.S. at 92).
63 477 U.S. 79 (1988).
64 Id.; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982). Section 9712 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Mandatory sentence. - Any person who is convicted in any court of this
Commonwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter,
rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery as defined in 18
Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), aggravated assault
... or kidnapping, or who is convicted of attempt to commit any of these
crimes, shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commis-
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a preponderance of the evidence.6 5 Although decided prior to the
enactment of the Guidelines, McMillan set forth the constitutional
standards a sentencing guidelines statute must meet, and indi-
cated the boundary at which such statutes may be
unconstitutional. 6
In McMillan, the Supreme Court found that a sentencing
guideline statute would be constitutionally permissible as long as
it did not allow sentencing factors to become additional elements
of the crime.6 7 At issue was a sentencing provision which made
visible possession of a weapon an important sentencing factor for
several different felonies.6 Under the Pennsylvania guidelines, if
the state could prove visible possession of a weapon beyond a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the trial judge was required to sen-
tence the convicted defendant to a minimum of five years.6 1 Sev-
eral defendants challenged the provision as violative of due
process. 70 They argued that, in effect, the guidelines made visible
possession of a weapon an element of each of the crimes enumer-
ated in the statute without requiring the state to prove visible pos-
session beyond a reasonable doubt.71 The Court disagreed.
72
sion of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years
of total confinement notvithstanding any other provision of this title or
other statute to the contrary.
Id.
65 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 92-93. In McMillan, the defendant was convicted of
aggravated assault after shooting the victim in the right buttock. Id. at 82. McMillan
was sentenced to a term of three to ten years. Id. at 82 n.2. The state proceeded under
§ 9712 and introduced evidence of the visible possession of a firearm. Id. at 82-83. The
trial court, however, declared the statute unconstitutional. Id. The Commonwealth
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania overruled the trial court, finding
the statute to be consistent with due process. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
McMillan argued that § 9712 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it made visible possession an element of each of the enumerated
crimes without requiring the state to prove the visible possession beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and found the provision
constitutional. Id. at 91. Central to the Court's decision was the finding that the stat-
ute did not redefine any elements of the crime as sentencing factors. Id. at 89-90.
66 Id. at 79.
67 Id. at 89. After noting that the Pennsylvania statute did not "evade the com-
mands of Winship," the Court stated: "The Pennsylvania Legislature did not change
the definition of any existing offense. It simply took one factor that has always been
considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment-the instrumentality used in
committing a violent felony-and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor
.... " Id. at 89-90.
68 Id. at 81-82.
69 Id. at 81.
70 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83.
71 Id. at 83-84.
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
First, the Court held that there was no evidence that the state
legislature intended to make visible possession of a weapon an ele-
ment of each of the enumerated crimes.73 Rather, the legislature
intended to limit the discretion of the trial judge at sentencing if
visible possession could be proven in connection with the crime.'
Importantly, the Court noted that a determination of visible pos-
session would never allow a sentencing judge to order a sentence
beyond the maximum number of years allowed by the statute. 5
Rather, such a determination would only deprive the judge of the
discretion to give less than a five year sentence.76 These factors
were crucial to the Court's finding that the Pennsylvania guide-
lines gave "no impression of having been tailored to permit the
visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense."77 Thus, visible possession of a weapon could
be treated as a sentencing consideration, rather than an element
of a particular offense, because the guidelines did not give the
state "unbridled power to redefine crimes to the detriment of crim-
inal defendants."7 8
The defendants also argued that even if visible possession
was found not to be an element of the enumerated crimes, due
process required that visible possession be proven at sentencing
by clear and convincing evidence.79 The Court had "little difficulty
concluding that... the preponderance standard satisfies due pro-
cess,"80 noting that sentencing courts have traditionally made de-
terminations from evidence presented "without any prescribed
burden of proof at all"81 and that there was nothing in the statute
to "warrant constitutionalizing burdens of proof at sentencing." 2
A preponderence standard as the appropriate burden of proof
at sentencing under the Guidelines is consistent with the Court's
dictate in McMillan. The Court concluded that "once the reason-
able doubt standard has been applied to obtain a valid conviction,"
the criminal defendant's due process rights were not impaired by
72 Id. at 84-86.
73 Id. at 86-87.
74 Id. at 88.
75 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88 n.4.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 88.
78 Id. at 86.
79 Id. at 91.
80 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 92.
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a lesser standard of proof at sentencing. 83 McMillan made clear
that, as a general rule, sentencing courts may hear evidence and
find facts "without any prescribed burden of proof at all."8 4 There-
fore, application of a preponderance standard does not offend due
process. This standard will thus achieve the primary goal of the
Guidelines-uniformity in federal sentencing.8 5
CONCLUSION
Based on the presumption of innocence, our society has estab-
lished stringent rules which protect the rights of criminal defend-
ants. Proponents of a clear and convincing standard at sentencing
essentially argue that some of the numerous and extensive rights
afforded to accused criminals should be extended to convicted
criminals. Neither the Constitution nor Supreme Court precedent
give a convicted criminal the right to a heightened standard of
proof at sentencing. To adopt such a standard would only serve to
place the rights of criminal convicts above those of society as a
whole, a result which is neither constitutionally justified nor mor-
ally required.
Daniel J. Lyons
83 Id. at 92 n.8.
84 Id. at 91.
85 See supra note 2.
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